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Oct. 1944J MITCHELL tJ. CEAZAN TIRES, LTD. 45 
[L. A. No. 18690. In ~nk. Oct. 31, 1944.] 
.,. . 
ALFRED D. MITCHELL et a1., Appellants, v. CEAZAN 
TIRES, ~TD .. Respondent. 
[1] Landlord and· Ten~Termination~Frustration of Purpose. 
-A lessee who was authorized to use the premises for an au-
tomobile tire business and other related businesses, such as 
automobile supplies, was not «!!reused from further perform-
ance under the lease by governmental regulations restricting 
the free sale of new automobile tires, where the lease was 
executed in 1940, when thE' E'ntry of this country into the war 
was the subject of mueh debate. so that such an event was 
not so remote as to be unforeseeable, and whE're, regardless 
of such anticipation. the JeaRP retainpd valne for the leRsee. 
[2] Id. - Termination -Frustra.tion of Purpose.-The excuse of 
frustration, like that of impossibility. is a conclusion of law 
drawn by the court from the fa('t~ of a given case: and in an 
action for declaration of rig-hts under a lease for aD. automo-
bile tire business and other related businesses. althoug-h the 
court found that the lessee's business was "frustrated" and 
rendered "unlawful" and "impossible" by ~overnmental regu-
lations restricting- the free sale of new automobile tires, the 
evidence did not establish that the salE' of new tires was made 
illegal or impo~sible. or that the purpose of the lease was 
frustrated Nor was thp leRsee Aided by a finding- that the 
related lawful conduct of the husinesse~ was an implied condi-
tion of the lease rendered impossible by said reg-ulations, 
where there was nothing to show that such businesses were 
made il1egaI. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John Gee Clark. Judge. Reversed. 
Action by lessor against lessee for declaratory relief. Judg-
ment for defendant reversed. 
[1] Lease of property for specified exclusive uses as affected by 
a partial restriction upon such uses by statute, ordinance or ruling 
adopted or made during the term, note. 7 A.L.R. 836. See, also, 
15 Ca1.Jur. 770; 32 Am.Jur. 700. 
McK. Die. Beference: [1,2] Landlord and Tenant, § 197. 
) 
) 
M1TCIIELL V. CEAZAN TIHES, LTD. r25 C.2d 
L. D. TThlmnn for A pp('l1:mt.s. 
Charles J. Katz, Alfred: Gitelsol1, Mose Katzen and Samuel 
W. Blum for R('spondplt. 
THA y.t\OH, J .-011 ~larch 21, 1940, plaintiffs leased to de-
fendant corporation, a w1f'OIesalf dealer in automobile tires 
and tubes, then in possessiol] ullder an earlier lease since 1937, 
for a three-year term to begin July 25, 1940, certain premises 
located at 1147 American Avenue in the city of Long Beach, 
used by defendant as one of several wholesale outlets for its 
business. The lease provided among other things that "The 
Lessee shal1 have full control and occupancy of the buildings 
upon said premises and may sublet or sublease any part or 
portion thereof to any acceptable and responsible person, 
but the Lessee is to be liable for the rentals herein reserved 
and for the performance of all the conditions of this lease 
imposed upon the Lessee. 
"The premises hereby leased are to be used for the conduct 
of an automobile tire business and other related businesses 
such as automobile supplies, and in no event for a business 
that would increase fire hazard or insurance rates." 
On December 11. 194], the federal government issued an 
order restricting the sale of automobile tires and tubes to 
persons assigned to A-3 or better preferential rating. On 
December 30, 1941, the Office of Price Administration promul-
gated a series of Tire Rationing Regulations, which super-
seded earHer regulations. The regulations were revised on 
February 11, 1942, to include recapped and retreaded tires. 
On February 23, 1942, plaintiff received written notice from 
defendant that it had concluded that the effect of the govern-
mental regulations on the sale of tires excused it from further 
performance under the lease, and that it would quit the prem-
ises on February 25, 1942. Defendant vacated the premises 
and plaintiffs brought this action on March 3, 1942, seeking 
a judgment declaring that the lease remaIned in effect. The 
trial court found that the total amount of business transacted 
by defendant in California, Arizona and Nevada in the year 
1941, was approximately $2,000,000 without indicating what 
proportion of the business was transacted at the Long Beach 
establishment and that the business transacted by defendant 
from December 11. 1941, to February 25, 1942, totaled $2,500. 
It concluded that the effect of the government regulations on 
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defendant's business excused it from further performance 
under the lease. From the jUdgllJL'llt d('chlring the.lc:1~c ter-
minated plaintifl appeals. 
[1] Since the sale of new and used til'CS remains lawful 
although on a restricted basis, no qucstiqn of illegality or 
impos~ibility arises. The problem is one of commercia1 frus-
tration of the purp;pse and value of a lease where wartime 
regulations have operated to restrict the business being en-
gaged in on the leased premises. The principles applicable 
are those declared in Lloyd v< Murphy, post, p. 48 [153 P.2d 
47], where the same problem was involved. The lease in 
the present case is less restrictive than the lease in Lloyd 
v. Murphy, supra, for it authorizes the lessee to engage in 
"other related businesses such as automobile supplies" and 
permits subleasing" any part or portion thereof to an~' ac-
ceptable and responsible person. n 
Defendant has proven neither that the risk of war and gov-
ernmental regulations restricting the free sale of new auto-
mobile tires was not reasonably foreseeable nor that the yalue 
of the lease has been virtually destroyed. The lease in the 
present case was executed on :\farch 21, 1940, when the entry 
of this country into the war was the subject of much debate, 
so that such an event was not so remote as to be unforeseea ble. 
Even assuming that such an event and its effect upon civilian 
tire production and consumption were outside the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties~ the lease nevertheless retained 
value for defendant. 
There is nothing in the lease prohibiting the sale of reccon-
ditioned tires. It is common knowledge that there is a great 
demand for such tires and those presently engaged in the 
business meet this demand by recapping and retreading old 
tires and selling them to consumers. Furthermore, the lease 
provides that the premises may be freely used for "other 
related businesses such as automobile supplies." If defendant 
finds it impractical, unprofitable or for other reasons does 
not wish to engage in any other business than as an exclusive 
agency for the sale of a particular brand of new tires it may 
nevertheless freely sublease the premises. Defendant has not 
proved or offered to prove that the leased premises on Ameri-
can Avenue, one of the principal traffic arteries in the city 
of Long Beach, are not commercially desirable or adaptable 
to use for the "other related businesses" authorized by the 
lease. 
